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Glossary 
 
 
Contagion - the evidence of "excess co-movement" in stock and commodity prices 
between the financial markets. 
Credit risk – the risk that customers fail to comply with their obligations to service debt, 
or the risk of counterparty default on its obligations. 
Foreign exchange risk (FX risk) – the risk of losses due to changes in exchange rates. 
Interest rate risk – the risk of declines of earnings due to the movements of interest rates.  
Liquidity risk – the risk of inability to cover the maturing liabilities with the available 
assets; also, the risk of inability to raise funding at a reasonable cost.   
Non-performing loan - a loan that is not earning income: full payment of principal and 
interest is no longer anticipated, principal or interest is 90 days or more delinquent, or the 
maturity date has passed and payment in full has not been made. 
Operational risk – the risk of losses due to malfunctioning of the information systems, 
reporting systems, and internal risk monitoring rules. 
Second round effects (feedback effects) - change in the behavior of the bank portfolio or 
realignment of the portfolio structure in response to the change in risk factors. 
Stress-testing – the procedure of evaluation of a bank‘s financial position under a severe 
but plausible scenario with the goal of assisting in decision-making within the bank. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
A common feature of past and recent financial crises is the instability in the financial 
sector, accompanied by downturn in the economic activity. The similar situation has been 
observed in Ukraine in the course of crisis of 2008 unfolding. First of all, the crisis 
staggered the stability of the banking system. The situation has been further worsened by 
significant devaluation of local currency, combined with the big share of loans previously 
granted in foreign currency
1. As a result, the decrease of customers‘ solvency has been 
observed: during the first quarter of 2009, the quality of banking assets has worsened 
substantially due to the increase in the share of non-performing loans
2
.  Moreover, the 
volumes of new bank funding attraction and existing loans repayment are negatively 
influenced by the downsize both in the profits of corporate clients and population. The 
latter, in turn, result from the crisis consequences in the macroeconomy, such as the 
decrease in aggregate demand, fall in GDP and real wages, and leaping unemployment.     
In the conditions described, maintenance of the banking system stability becomes the key 
task for the National Bank of Ukraine. The main questions that arise in such context are 
the following. Firstly, it is needed to determine how sensitive individual banks are to the 
shocks increase during the crisis. Secondly, it is required to estimate the possibility of 
whole system failure if certain banks do not survive. Thirdly, the important issue to 
consider is the amount of the potential costs for the Ukrainian budget, given the bank 
failures. 
 
Answering these questions requires adequate estimation of the impact of different types of 
shocks that the banks are exposed to during the crisis. The need for such estimation 
steams from that the pre-crisis assessments carried out by banks could have understated 
the size of risks and resulted in insufficient hedging safeguards. Reasons for this problem 
are twofold. On the one hand, the banks may have had insufficient incentives to form the 
additional capital hedging from risks with very ‗low‘ probability (as it was thought before 
the crisis): firstly, holding the excess insuring capital buffers is costly; secondly, the banks 
could have expected that the National Bank of Ukraine would bail them out and provide 
additional liquidity in case the need for such intervention arises.  
                                                 
1
  As of 01.04.2009, 70% of total loans of the banking system in Ukraine have been denominated in 
foreign currency. Source: Rating agency ―Credit Rating‖, www.credit-rating.ua. 
2
  From 01.01.2009 to 01.04.2009, the share of non-performing loans in Ukrainian banks has 
increased from 3.88% to 6.13%. Source: Rating agency ―Credit Rating‖, www.credit-rating.ua.  
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On the other hand, the methodology of risk impact assessment could have failed. Stress-
testing framework, usually applied in the world banking practice for the purposes of 
potential shock impact estimation, is uncommon in Ukraine: though the National Bank of 
Ukraine recommends it for use in the Ukrainian banks, no regulator‘s recommendations or 
guidelines concerning the procedure of stress-testing have been provided, so the banks 
have had to develop the needed methodological and empirical tools themselves. Such 
treatment from the regulator‘s side has resulted in that stress-testing was used by only a 
small number of Ukrainian banks in the pre-crisis period. Even the banks that applied it 
could have taken the mechanical approach to stress-testing, which resulted in insufficient 
flexibility of the method and its inability to comprise the rapid changes in market 
environment as the crisis unfolded.  
 
Moreover, the global crisis that started in 2007 has revealed the weak sides even in the 
common approach to stress-testing, taken in the banking practice of developed countries. 
Such weaknesses relate to the following issues: 
1) Stress-tests, similarly to other risk-management models, often are based upon historical 
statistical relationships (for example, correlations between asset prices).Such relationships 
are assumed to be appropriate for forecasting the development of risk events in future. 
However, in case the crisis is preceded by a long period of stability, the major shocks to 
the market that occur in real life will be more severe than the historical-based scenario 
could have foreseen. Thus, the results of modeling become unreliable. 
2) Stress-tests often didn‘t account for feedback effects arising from the change in 
behaviour of market participants, and for system-level interactions. Such tendencies can 
provoke rapid changes in the risk characteristics over time, and initial shocks may 
increase consequently, as it happened in the recent crisis. 
3) Extreme cases usually have low weight in stress-testing models, especially in those 
based on historical data. Also, the bank risk analytics used to choose mild scenarios, 
assume insufficient shock size and shorter duration compared to what was observed in 
real life during the crisis.  
4) Stress-testing was often conducted for individual types of risks, or for separate 
portfolios, which led to improper aggregation of risk exposures (or absence of such 
aggregation) at the bank level. The correlations between different types of risks have been 
rarely accounted for, as well. In addition, overall risk exposures may have been 
underestimated due to omitting certain issues that became crucial during the crisis, such as 
5 
 
 
the credit quality of portfolios, possible changes in liquidity of financial instruments and 
duration of potential illiquidity, reputational risk, off-balance sheet exposures (concerning 
instruments like letters of guarantee, letters of credit and other liabilities related to risk of 
counterparty default).   
 
Therefore, there arises the need in developing the procedure of stress-testing, which 
would be able to account for the drawbacks revealed by the recent crisis, and in applying 
the mentioned procedure to test the stability of Ukrainian banking system. The research 
interest supporting the latter objective stems from the fact that the majority of previous 
works describe the application of stress-testing to the banking systems of developed 
countries, while little attention has been paid to the transition countries. Ukraine, being an 
example of country in transition, is characterized by certain peculiarities of economy and 
financial sector such as the significant structural changes in the banking system during the 
recent decade (growing number of banks, development of the new types of financial 
instruments, entrance of foreign banks into Ukrainian market), increasing importance of 
the banking sector and its continuing integration with the economy. All of these factors 
could contribute to obtaining the research results differing significantly from the findings 
derived for the developed countries. Apart from that, there is a lack in empirical research 
on the topic at the banking system level for the countries in transition.  
 
Practical implications of the study can be used by the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) 
for the purposes of banking supervision and forecasting. In addition, the results from the 
study can be used for development of policy initiatives by the NBU aimed at supporting 
the stability of banking system, for instance, enhancing of banks‘ liquidity buffers. Also, 
the commercial banks may employ the methodology and research findings in the course of 
risk management and strategic planning in the crisis conditions, for example, to determine 
the overall sensitivity of the bank to shocks during the crisis, and to estimate the size of 
capital needed to insure against the risks.  
 
The theoretical importance of the study lies in that it would allow developing of the 
adequate model for estimation of the impact of different types of shocks on the Ukrainian 
banking system. The model designed would incorporate the peculiarities of the Ukrainian 
banking system as that of the transition country. Moreover, for the first time the overall 
impact of the shocks on the Ukrainian banking sector will be determined at the system 
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level, as previously the stress tests have been conducted for the separate Ukrainian banks 
and separate types of shocks only. Also, this study can contribute to further development 
of the tools applicable in the crisis conditions and serve as a basis for elaboration of 
plausible analytical procedures of banking risk analysis, thus assisting in matching of the 
methodological base currently employed in the Ukrainian banks to the real-life needs and 
to the practices applied in the developed countries. 
 
The goals of this study are, first, to develop the procedure of stress-testing of the 
Ukrainian banking system, which would be able to embrace major types of banking risks 
and to comprise the movements in the financial environment during the crisis, as well as 
the second-round effects; second, to apply the mentioned procedure in order to estimate 
the potential impact of the crisis; and third, to work out the practical recommendations for 
the NBU and the commercial banks, aimed on maintaining the banking system stability in 
the crisis conditions.  
 
Based on the work goals, the research questions may be defined. First, it is necessary to 
determine how the different types of shocks influence the stability of the separate 
Ukrainian banks and that of the whole banking system. Second, it is needed to decide how 
the separate shocks should be aggregated to get the overall risk measure relevant at the 
bank level, and how the exposures for banks should be aggregated into system-level 
measure. Third, the shocks impact on stability of the banking system in the crisis period 
and the related consequences for the separate banks should be determined. The related 
task would concern specifying the reasons for the separate banks to withstand the shocks 
impact or to fail. Finally, it is needed to figure out the potential costs for the state budget 
which could be required to support the banking system stability in case of bank failures.   
The hypotheses related to the questions set are as follows. The stability of the whole 
system would be found sufficient to withstand the impact of shocks; however, not all the 
banks would survive the crisis. It is expected that the ownership of the bank, its size, and 
its importance for the whole system are important for surviving the crisis. Among the 
shocks explored, the foreign exchange (FX) shock and the credit shock are expected to 
have the most important impact.    
 
In order to answer the research questions and test the hypotheses, this study would employ 
the procedure of stress-testing. Such approach allows taking into account the important 
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linkages between the banking system and the dynamics of key macroeconomic indicators, 
as well as reflecting adequately the connections between separate banking institutions 
inside the system. Stress-testing is proposed by Basel Committee of Banking Supervision 
and used by a number of banks and international financial institutions including World 
Bank and IMF as a tool for assessment of impact on the bank of significant but possible 
changes in the business environment. It is also a common method of investigation whether 
the banking institutions possess the sufficient capital stock to withstand the downturn in 
financial market and macroeconomy. The procedure of stress-testing will be conducted in 
the form of scenario analysis, which would allow determining the impact on the overall 
risks of banking system from the combination of potential shocks: change in the foreign 
exchange rate, change in interest rate, worsening of credit portfolio quality, change in 
operational costs, and decrease in market liquidity.    
 
The data to be used include the financial statements and balance sheets of the biggest 
Ukrainian banks for the period of 2002-2009, obtained from the Association of the 
Ukrainian Banks. Also, the time series of macroeconomic indicators‘ dynamics (including 
inflation, unemployment, FX rates, interest rates, and GDP growth) for the same period 
can be retrieved from the State Statistics Committee website. Additionally, the interbank 
lending matrix may be obtained from the NBU.  
 
The following part of this work is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the review of 
the literature related to the research questions and scientific approaches to the topic 
exploration. Chapter 3 presents the outline of the methodology, argumentation supporting 
the choice of research approach as well as delimitations of the method and possible ways 
of overcoming them. Chapter 4 concludes the present work with the time schedule of 
research.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
The research relevant to the topic, which is investigated in this work, may be subdivided 
into three groups: literature considering the modeling of individual banking risks, works 
on the estimation of crisis impact on the separate market agents or groups of agents, and 
the articles related to the assessment of total risk exposure at the system level. 
 
As for the first group of studies, its importance lays in that it presents a number of models  
for estimation of separate risk exposures of banking institutions. Both Ukrainian and 
Western research literature counts numerous works analyzing the bank exposure to such 
kinds of risk as credit risk, interest risk, liquidity risk and market risk (Krylova and 
Nabok, 2008; Finkelshtejn, 2001; Bessis, 2002). The range of methods used, however, is 
generally limited to gap analysis, duration analysis, scoring models, VaR estimation and 
Capital-at-risk (CAR) concept (e.g. Chemerys and Uvarov, 2002; Bondarenko, 2007). For 
example, Chemerys and Uvarov (2002) describe the approach to the interest risk 
quantification, which is based on the assessing the duration covenants that characterize the 
sensitivity of financial assets value to the changes in interest rates and allow to perform a 
rough estimation of the interest rate risks exposures that the financial institution faces. 
The authors present the detailed description of the economic meaning of duration and the 
mathematical framework employed for its calculation, focusing on the practical 
application of the method for the purposes of interest rate risk management in the 
financial institutions. 
Bondarenko (2007) describes the process of developing a scoring model for the estimation 
of credit risk of a bank. A scoring model is a specific type of mathematical model that 
involves consideration of individual characteristics of a borrower and determination on 
this basis of a certain quantitative indicator – a scoring rating – describing the solvency of 
a borrower, that is, the possibility of successful repayment of a loan, or, contrarily, the 
probability of default on a loan. This kind of models is applied in estimation of the 
financial state of a counterparty before the loan is granted, as well as for the purpose of 
assessment and monitoring of creditworthiness during the life-term of a loan. 
The common method used to assess the liquidity risk is gap analysis, the procedure of 
estimation of the gap  between the liquid assets and maturing liabilities of the banking 
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institutions, by the time baskets defined on the base of remaining term to maturity. If the 
liabilities exceed the available liquid assets, the bank has to pay attention to the attraction 
of additional sources of funding. However, as the common assumption of the method is 
the stability of the funding price, gap analysis doesn't provide the forecast for the liquidity 
gap dynamics in case the cost of funding increases (Bessis, 2002).   
Another common method for assessment of all types of banking risks, most often applied 
to market and credit risk estimation, is the calculation of VaR (value-at-risk) and the 
related measure of CAR (capital adequacy ratio). VaR is a quantitative measure of risk 
reflecting the size of losses, which at the given confidence level (for example, in 99% of 
all possible cases) will not be exceeded during the certain period of time. Capital 
adequacy ratio is the ratio of bank's regulatory capital to the risk-weighted assets. For 
every VaR estimate related to a certain banking risk exposure, the corresponding 
additional amount of capital can be determined, which is needed to hedge against this risk 
(Bessis, 2002). The drawback of these methods is that estimation of VaR requires 
specifying certain statistical distribution of expected losses, which in practice may be 
difficult due to absence of the needed data history and unreliability of simulation 
modeling, as well as due to the fact that distributions best fitting the financial sector data 
are often very sophisticated, which implies difficulties in further estimation.       
The significant drawbacks peculiar for the first group of studies are related to the static 
nature of the methods and models applied, and the limited applicability of results obtained 
for strategic management of the banking system. In addition, the application of the 
mentioned group of methods requires relative stability in the data (absence of strong 
volatility and sudden severe shocks), which makes them inappropriate for use in the 
course of risk analysis in crisis conditions. 
 
The second group of studies includes the works concerning the crisis impact on the 
separate agents and groups of agents in the economy and the banking system. The 
importance of this branch of literature for present research lies in that it is helpful for 
developing the scenarios of possible shocks to the banking system, implied by the 
movements in the macroeconomy. For example, knowing the impact of crisis on the 
behaviour and financial state of private individuals (or corporates), one can predict the 
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potential amounts of deposits withdrawal and loans non-repayment in relation to the 
banking sector.     
As a subgroup, this branch of literature includes numerous surveys from US, Western 
Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe (including Ukraine) concerning the influence of 
the crisis. For example, Red C (2008) gives an insight on the general impact of crisis on 
the Irish people. The main findings include the decrease in the disposable income and 
savings, and the decrease in trust to banks. The quantitative survey conducted by New 
Bridge (2008) shows that in Ukraine, the majority of people during the crisis would also 
prefer to keep savings at home instead of banks, and withdraw their deposits. Also, the 
banks tend to decrease the amounts of lending and set up more severe requirements for 
borrowers.  
The research literature belonging to the second group presents a range of methods used to 
analyze the impact of crisis on the institutions belonging to different sectors of economy. 
One of the methods that is most common for Western publications is VaR (Value-at-
Risk), employed to estimate the possible fluctuations in macro- and microeconomic 
indicators and the impact of such fluctuations on the financial state of the institution, that 
is, maximum possible losses or the probability of default. For example, Pesaran et al 
(2004) and Alves (2004) use a VAR model to assess the impact of macroeconomic 
variables on firms‘ probabilities of default. In Pesaran et al (2004) the VAR includes 
GDP, consumer prices, the nominal money supply, equity prices, exchange rates, and 
nominal interest rates for eleven countries for 1979-1999. Alves (2004) constructs a co-
integrated VAR, using KMV‘s corporate expected default frequencies as endogenous 
variables and macroeconomic factors (the twelve-month change in industrial output, the 
three-month interest rate, the oil price, and the twelve-month change in a broad stock 
market index) as exogenous variables. The expected default frequency (EDF) of each EU 
industrial sector is modelled based on exogenous macroeconomic factors and the EDFs of 
other industrial sectors to capture the possibility of contagion, or shock transmission 
between the industries. However, the application of VaR methodology to the analysis of 
banking institutions is complicated, as it generally doesn't account for the quality of bank's  
assets, which deteriorates during the crises.   
The wide range of methodologies is applied also to model the behaviour of economy as a 
whole in respect to the banking crises. The Western empirical studies on banking crises 
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generally use two standard econometric tools. The first is the signals approach, which 
studies and contrasts behaviors of economic indicators for periods before and after a 
crisis, and identifies the factors that best signal the upcoming crisis based on over- or 
under-reaching of certain threshold values (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). The paper 
mentioned analyzes the ―twin crises‖ or the occurrence of both currency and banking 
crises, in a sample of 20 countries during 1970–95. The authors find that banking crises 
were frequently related to large exchange rate movements characterizing currency crises. 
They also show that banking crises were preceded by a decline in output partly reflecting 
deteriorating terms of trade, rapid financial liberalization characterized by growth of 
credit and rising cost of credit (interest rates), decline in the growth of exports and 
appreciating real exchange rates. The second approach estimates the probability of a 
banking crisis using a limited dependent variable model (Demirguc and Detragiache, 
2005). The authors study a sample of 31 countries during 1980–1994, and find that low 
real GDP growth, high real interest rates, high inflation, positive credit growth, and an 
increase in exposure of banks to the private sector raises the probability of a banking 
crisis. 
Both approaches  mentioned consider the significance of individual factors in emergence 
of banking crises. In contrast, Duttagupta and Cashini (2008) maintain that such crises are 
most often provoked by a combination of weaknesses rather than a single factor of impact. 
The authors use a Binary Classification Tree (BCT) model to analyze banking crises in 50 
emerging market and developing countries during 1990–2005. The BCT identifies key 
indicators and their threshold values at which vulnerability to banking crisis increases. 
The three conditions identified as crisis-causing— very high inflation, highly dollarized 
bank deposits combined with nominal depreciation or low liquidity, and low bank 
profitability—highlight that foreign currency risk, low level of financial soundness, and 
macroeconomic instability are the key vulnerabilities that may trigger the banking crises.  
 
The third group of studies describes the approaches to determination of the crisis impact 
on the banking system as a whole. The significance of such works stems from that they 
provide tools allowing to grasp the system-wide effects and relationships, which are 
important to include into analysis in addition to the single-risk or single-bank models.  
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Numerous literature belonging to this group proposes to use the stress-testing procedure. 
This approach appeared in the early 1990‘s; however, the research on the topic has been 
actively developing since then. The majority of system-level and country-level stress-
testing methodologies have been developed in the course of the IMF Financial Sector 
Assessment Programme (IMF, 2003). Most of these tests have been conducted by the 
large banks themselves, based on scenarios developed from the Bank of England‘s 
Medium Term Macroeconometric Model. Resultantly, a number of papers concerning the 
development of applied stress-testing scenarios comes from the countries participating in 
FSAP, such as Czech Republic, UK, Finland, Austria and others. 
The most common approach used in IMF country FSAPs are single factor sensitivity tests. 
These consider the impact of a marked change in one variable, such as the exchange rate 
or the policy interest rate, on banks‘ balance sheets. However, these stress tests do not 
allow for the interaction between macroeconomic variables (‗scenarios‘) such as the 
impact of changes in the interest rate on real activity and thus on banks‘ loan portfolio. 
Scenarios can be developed through a number of methods. One approach is to use a 
structural macroeconomic model. This was done, for example, in a number of IMF FSAPs 
on developed countries. Macroeconomic stress tests of the financial system,  developed in 
recent years, assess the vulnerability of the banking system, or more broadly the financial 
system, to extreme but plausible adverse macroeconomic shocks (Sorge, 2004). Stress 
tests are important from a central bank‘s perspective, since they are tractable and provide 
a useful benchmark to assess the risks to the financial system. An example is the paper by 
Hoggarth, Sorensen and Zicchino (2005), which uses the macroeconomic approach for 
stress testing the UK banking system. The distinctive feature of this work is that authors 
take into account the dynamics between banks‘ write-offs and key macroeconomic 
variables, through conditioning the stress test on the historical correlation between the 
variables and allowing for feedback effects from credit risk to the macroeconomy. The 
main findings indicate that both UK banks‘ total and corporate write-offs are significantly 
related to deviations of actual output level from potential one. The results suggest that 
―even if the most extreme economic stress conditions witnessed over the nearest future 
were repeated, the UK banking sector would remain robust‖ (Hoggarth, Sorensen and 
Zicchino, 2005). However, the stress tests proposed, like most other methodologies 
applied in the research on the topic, may not fully capture structural changes in the 
banking industry. 
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A number of related studies have been conducted in Czech National Bank. For example, 
Cihak (2007) provides an overview of the stress testing of the Czech banking sector 
conducted by the Czech National Bank. The results of interbank contagion tests (both 
simple and combined) based on Czech banks‘ exposures on the interbank market are 
offered. Also, the paper integrates the stress testing with CNB macroeconomic forecasts, 
macroeconomic credit-risk model, impact on individual bank portfolios, and interbank 
contagion. One baseline and three alternative scenarios tested have found the Czech 
banking sector to be relatively resilient to the shocks.  
The studies that describe stress-testing approaches in light of the recent crisis of 2007 are 
mostly concerned with the development of  new scenario types and risk models allowing 
to capture the interactions between different types of risks, as well as include into analysis 
the feedback effects and inter-country exposures. For example, the paper by Wong and 
Hui (2009) proposes the procedure of stress-testing allowing to account for the 
relationship between market and credit risk, estimated econometrically on the basis of 
historic data for the system. Based on the designed methodology, the authors conduct a 
stress-testing of the group of banks in Hong Kong, using the publicly available data for 
the end of 2007. The findings suggest that the banks tested would be vulnerable to asset 
price shocks only in case of the long duration of such shocks or the simultaneous 
influence of interest rates increase due to contractionary monetary policy. Another work 
by Boss et al (2007) presents the results from stress-testing the exposures of Austrian 
banking system for two macroeconomic scenarios close to the real-life events of the 
recent crisis, namely: the shock to the financial markets of CEE countries, to which the 
Austrian banks have significant credit exposures; and the shock to global economic 
activity resulting in failures on repayment of the Austrian household loans. Moreover, the 
authors perform additional sensitivity tests for a credit risk based on potential shock 
related to foreign currency lending. The results of stress-testing indicate that the Austrian 
banking system is resilient to the significant shocks ‗due to the substantial capital buffers 
and high level of profitability‘, as the authors maintain.  
This study employs the procedure of stress-testing, as it is the most well-argued and 
developed approach to the chosen research problem for today. Moreover, it allows taking 
into account the projected dynamics of key macroeconomic indicators through linking the 
changes in the banking system to that in the economy as a whole.    
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Overall, the Western literature related to the topic of this work is rather well-developed,  
while the number and scientific novice of Ukrainian studies is clearly insufficient.  
Consequently, the research conducted would make a valuable contribution into the 
theoretical and empirical knowledge applied for modeling the banking system of Ukraine, 
for the following reasons: 
 the lack of empirical research at the banking system level in Ukraine; 
 the need for developing a stress-testing methodology for general use; 
 the necessity of enhancement and further development of the methodological basis 
of banking risks assessment; 
 the importance of shock impact assessment on the banking system of Ukraine as 
an economy in transition, further strengthened by the development of financial crisis 
in 2009. 
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Concept of Stress-Testing 
 
Stress tests are an analytical technique that can be used to estimate a particular sensitivity 
of institution to a certain shock. Stress tests were originally developed for use at the 
portfolio level, to understand the potential risks resulting from extreme movements in 
market prices. They have now become widely used as a risk management tool by financial 
institutions. Further, this technique has been employed with the aim of measuring the 
sensitivity of a group of institutions, such as commercial banks, or even an entire financial 
system to common shocks. 
This work focuses on system-wide, or macrofinancial, stress tests, which measure the 
impact of shocks on financial system stability. Compared to stress tests for individual 
financial institutions, the system-wide stress tests have wider coverage, are used for a 
different purpose, that is, financial sector supervision rather than risk management, focus 
more on channels of contagion (how a risk to one institution can become a systemic risk), 
and often have to use more common techniques because of the subsequent complexity of 
calculations. Also, system-wide stress testing is a much newer concept, and the literature 
on the topic is thus much shorter than that on stress testing for individual institutions. The 
system-wide nature of the stress tests, however, does not mean that they should be 
performed on aggregate data. Applying the tests to the financial system as a whole or to 
large groups of institutions can conceal substantial exposures at the level of individual 
institutions, which can lead to failures of these institutions and then contagion to the rest 
of the system. These exposures can get excluded during the aggregation (Cihak, 2004). 
So, it is important to perform the stress tests on an bank-by-bank basis while possible, and 
to analyze not only the aggregate results, but also the dispersion of the results around the 
aggregate figure. The positive implication from performing the stress tests this way is that 
they provide to the regulator an additional tool to identify vulnerable banks in the system. 
Stress tests can be classified by methodology into three main groups: sensitivity analysis, 
applied to identify how portfolios react to changes in relevant economic variables such as 
interest rates and exchange rates; scenario analysis, which allows to assess the robustness 
of financial institutions and the financial system to an exceptional but plausible scenario; 
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and contagion analysis, used to model the transmission of shocks from individual banks 
to the financial system as a whole. (Cihak, 2004a) 
The process of stress-testing generally begins with the identification of specific 
vulnerabilities or areas of concern, followed by the construction of a scenario in the 
context of a consistent macroeconomic framework. The next step is to map the outputs of 
the scenario into a form that is usable for an analysis of financial institutions‘ balance 
sheets and income statements, then performing the numerical analysis, considering any 
second round effects, and finally summarizing and interpreting the results. Each stage of 
the process is important to understanding the sensitivity of a financial system to a 
particular shock or vulnerability. Those stages are further discussed in detail. 
 
 
3.2 Steps of Stress-Testing  
 
3.2.1 Identifying the Vulnerabilities 
 
The first stage in the stress-testing process is identification of the main vulnerabilities of 
the system, which allows isolating possible areas from where the shocks can arise. Such 
weak areas may be defined through the analysis of macro-level indicators, structural 
indicators, and micro-level indicators (Jones, Hilbers and Slack, 2004). 
Knowledge of the macroeconomic environment (growth rates of consumption, 
investment, and incomes; unemployment rates; inflation; government deficit; current 
account deficit; official reserves) can provide the information about overall performance 
of the financial system and indicate potential sources of shocks. Analysis of such 
information allows determining what is normal for an economy and comparing it to other 
countries. Such analysis can also ease the macro simulations described further. 
Indicators of the structure of the financial system can help in determination of risks in the 
financial system. Such indicators include data on ownership and market shares, balance 
sheet structures, cashflow accounts.  
In addition to using the broad macroeconomic context and structural indicators, a range of 
financial soundness indicators (FSI) may be used to understand the financial system‘s 
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vulnerability to shocks and its capacity to absorb the losses. These indicators are more 
micro-level because they are typically derived from data on individual institutions or 
sectors. The health of the financial sector can be analyzed by considering trends in FSIs 
(capital adequacy, asset quality, profitability, liquidity, and exposure to market risks). 
 
3.2.2 Constructing the Scenarios 
 
The second stage of the process involves examination of the available data and models to 
determine what can be used to understand the behavior of the system with respect to the 
main vulnerabilities. Based on this data, a scenario can be constructed in the context of 
some overall macroeconomic framework or model. Usually, a macroeconometric or 
simulation model should form the basis of the stress testing scenarios. Using such model 
provides a forward-looking and consistent framework for analyzing key linkages between 
the financial system and the real economy. On the basis of analysis performed at the 
previous stage, it is necessary to determine the macro and financial variables that are the 
most volatile, deregulated, or likely to have the greatest impact on the financial system. 
Typically, such variables are sensitive to major shocks and thus can form the basis of a 
simulation scenario.  
In case no macro model is available, it may be necessary to rely on other approaches. The 
analysis may employ a textbook macro models, appended with the findings from existing 
empirical research, or models developed for another country having similar conditions 
(Jones, Hilbers and Slack, 2004). 
 
3.2.3 Balance-Sheet Implementation  
 
The next step of the procedure is to map the outputs of scenarios onto the balance sheets 
and income statements of financial institutions. There are two main approaches to 
translating or mapping scenarios into balance sheets: the ―bottom-up‖ approach, where 
estimates are based on data for individual portfolios, which can then be aggregated, and 
the ―top-down‖ approach, which uses aggregated or macro-level data to estimate the 
impact. 
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The disadvantage of a top-down approach is that applying the tests only to aggregated 
data could disregard the concentration of exposures at the level of individual institutions 
and linkages among the institutions (Cihak, 2007). This approach may therefore overlook 
the risk that failures in a few weak institutions can spread to the rest of the system. The 
bottom-up approach is able to capture the concentration of risks and contagion, and 
therefore is considered to produce more precise results, but it requires more data and is 
more calculationally complex. Having detailed information on exposures of individual 
banks to individual borrowers should in principle lead to more accurate results than using 
more aggregated data; however, especially for large and complex financial systems, it 
may lead to big computational problems. Most macro stress tests therefore try to combine 
the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of the bottom-up and top-down 
approaches. 
Implementing a stress test also requires to address the question: which institutions should 
be included in the exercise? The coverage of the stress testing exercise should be broad 
enough to represent a meaningful critical mass of the financial system, while keeping the 
number of institutions covered at a feasible level (for example, less than twenty). The total 
market share of the institutions involved, in terms of assets, deposits, or some other 
criteria such as importance in the payment system, can be used to determine a cutoff 
point. In countries with a large number of small institutions, like Ukraine, the usual 
approach is either aggregating smaller institutions into a single balance sheet or taking a 
representative sample of institutions, or even ignoring them if they are not systemically 
important (Jones, Hilbers and Slack, 2004). 
Another important question to consider in conducting a stress test is: what are the data 
constraints? The availability and quality of data impose major constraints on the nature of 
stress tests that can be performed. As noted in IMF and World Bank (2003), data 
limitations can come in four forms: 
1) Basic data availability, especially in countries where information on balance sheet  
exposures may not be available; 
2) Difficulty isolating specific exposures, especially among financial institutions in case 
of large complex financial institutions or the ones active in the derivative markets; 
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3) Lack of risk data, for example, duration or default measures, in countries where risk 
management systems are less sophisticated;  
4) Confidentiality issues, or limitations on what regulator is legally able to share with 
other parties. 
All of the issues outlined are peculiar for Ukraine. To overcome these difficulties, it is  
possible to work with the larger institutions to get better data or to calibrate some parts of 
the exercise. To deal with confidentiality issues, it may be possible to conduct the stress 
testing based on agreed assumptions and methodologies and to share the results in a form 
that is informative enough of the risk exposures, but would not breach confidentiality laws 
or protocols. 
Another important question to address in performing a system-focused stress test is: how 
big are the shocks? Stress-testing involves discovering the impact of exceptional but 
plausible events, so the scenarios considered should be beyond the normal range of 
experience. Scenarios can be based on historical data, that is, the largest observed changes 
or extreme values over a specified period, or they can be hypothetical and involve large 
movements thought to be plausible. Historical scenarios can be more intuitive since they 
were actually observed, but hypothetical scenarios may be more realistic, especially if the 
financial structure has changed significantly due to deregulation, liberalization, changes in 
monetary policy operating procedures, or changes in supervisory policies. Experiences of 
other countries can also be a useful example (Jones, Hilbers and Slack, 2004).  
 
3.2.4 Considering Second-Round Effects 
 
Most stress testing approaches assume there is no change in the behavior of the portfolio 
or no realignment of the portfolio structure in response to the change in risk factors. Stress 
tests are typically applied to a balance sheet at a point in time, and the impact is calculated 
as if the shock was valued at market prices. This approach is valid if the time horizon is 
relatively short, or if changes in the underlying portfolio take time to implement. But 
when the time horizon of a scenario or shock extends beyond a year or more, the 
assumption of no behavioral response becomes harder to justify. Similarly, for 
systemically important institutions or for systems as a whole, the assumption of no 
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feedback effects used in many stress tests may be an oversimplification. The policy 
environment may change over a longer horizon, as the authorities will react to the shocks. 
One approach that is often used to consider second round effects and linkages between 
institutions is the use of contagion models. These models attempt to estimate the impact of 
the failure of key institutions on other institutions and on the overall financial system. The 
practical application of contagion tests is discussed further. 
 
3.2.5 Interpretation of Results and Limitations of the Method 
 
When interpreting stress tests, one needs to consider their limits and the assumptions on 
which they are built. Typical stress tests view banks as static portfolios rather than 
actively behaving agents. A thorough examination of vulnerability, however, must take 
into account the fact that banks adapt dynamically to shocks in the environment. 
Depending on the kinds of incentives that banks face, these adaptations may overstate or 
understate  the vulnerabilities created by the initial shock. To understand the structure of 
incentives that banks face in particular circumstances, it is necessary to consider the 
environment in which banks operate, such as, for instance, the legal, accounting, tax, and 
regulatory conditions (Cihak, 2004a). Also, while stress test results are useful to evaluate 
effects of large movements in key variables, they still do not provide a precise measure of 
the magnitude of losses. As the Committee on the Global Financial System (2000) noted: 
typically, there are no probabilities attached to the outcomes of stress tests. Another issue 
against interpreting stress tests simply as predictors of default is related to their mark-to-
market nature. While mark-to-market loss estimates provide information about a bank‘s 
financial risk exposures, they do not show the ability of a bank to sustain losses. If the 
underlying model being stressed is incorrectly specified or estimated, then the conclusions 
drawn from a stress test may be invalid. This potential for ―model error‖ creates the need 
of comparing stress test results with other measures of risk exposure, such as financial 
soundness indicators. Stress tests are also unlikely to capture the full range and interaction 
of risk exposures, such as operational risk and legal risk, and may give only a partial 
picture of real-life risk exposures. Finally, stress tests typically consider only part of a 
bank‘s income generating operations, and thus banks may have significant income flows 
that are not covered by the stress test scenarios analyzed (Cihak, 2004a). 
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The analysis and discussion of stress testing results can be facilitated by a clear 
presentation of the output generated by stress tests, and of the underlying assumptions 
used to generate the results. The results may be presented by grouping the aggregate 
impact of the stress tests by type of risk and by scenario. The composition of expected 
losses, for example, as a proportion of capital or income, can be used to summarize the 
central results. For bottom-up approaches, descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard 
deviation, minimum, maximum, and number of institutions in each quantile) and peer 
group analysis can be used to show how the impact at the aggregate level is distributed 
across individual institutions (Jones, Hilbers and Slack, 2004). 
 
 
3.3 Individual Risk Issues 
 
3.3.1 Credit Risk 
 
Measuring credit risk involves estimation of a number of parameters: the probability of 
default on each instrument; the amount of the losses in the case of default, or loss given 
default, which may involve estimating the value of collateral; and the probability that 
other counterparties will default at the same time.  
There are two general approaches to system-wide stress tests for credit risk: (i) approaches 
based on loan performance data, which can be either purely mechanical (assuming certain 
shocks to performance of loans) or based on a regression analysis between loan 
performance and macroeconomic variables; (ii) approaches based on data on borrowers 
(for example, financial leverage, interest coverage). Further, each approach is discussed in 
detail. 
The advantage of approach based on loan performance data is that such data are relatively 
easily available to supervisors and include information about all sectors, including 
households, which are usually more difficult to get the data about. The key disadvantage 
of this approach is that NPLs are lagging indicators of asset quality. 
The first subgroup of approaches in this group are those based on asset reclassification. 
Under this approach, loans and other assets are moved one or more classification 
categories (classes) down. The effect of the loan reclassification on the capital ratio is 
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calculated after deducting the additional provisions from both the reported capital and the 
reported asset amounts. There are various types of asset reclassification. It can be purely 
mechanical, for example, a certain percent of loans in each category is moved down by a 
category; or it can be based on experience from past crisis episodes, for instance,  the 
percent of loans reclassified is the same as the percent of loans moving down during the 
last banking sector crisis. Alternatively, if the detailed information is available, analysis 
can be based on peer reviews when loans to the same borrower from different banks are 
reclassified according to the lowest grade assigned by a bank. Another approach is based 
on supervisory reviews: for example, if recent auditory checks in some banks have found 
significant differences between the reported and true classification of loans, a stress test 
could assess what would happen if similar differences were found in other banks. 
The second subgroup of approaches in this group are those based on a regression or a 
VAR model that includes NPLs and macroeconomic factors, such as real interest rates and 
GDP growth. The regressions can be estimated at sectoral level, if there are data on NPLs 
by economic sectors, or on the individual bank level to capture the banks‘ different 
sensitivities to macroeconomic developments. The latter approach can, though, be too 
computationally intensive; so it is more common to use regressions for aggregated data. 
Approaches based on data on borrowers have the advantage of providing more thorough 
way of assessment by explicitly modeling linkages between the state of the real sector and 
the financial sector. Another advantage is that the data on borrowers can help to indicate 
problems in the loan portfolio earlier than the loan classification data, which is by 
definition a lagging indicator. A drawback of this approach is that data on borrowers, 
especially households and SME, are often difficult to obtain and usually available only 
with long lags. 
There is a wide range of possible approaches to modeling credit risk, depending on the 
availability of data. An approach used in some countries is to estimate a logit model 
predicting individual bankruptcy probabilities as a function of age, size, industry 
characteristics, and corporate soundness indicators (leverage, earnings, liquidity, financial 
strength). The model would include interest and exchange rates on the right hand side, to 
capture the indirect risk. Individual banks would be included into analysis through their 
exposures to the various groups of companies. This can then be used to predict banks‘ 
potential losses, taking into account collateral as well. 
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A simpler approach is based on exposure variables. The basic idea of this approach is that 
if an exposure variable exceeds an estimated threshold, the default rate becomes higher. 
Similarly to the previous approach, this is mapped into banks‘ losses, taking into account 
the value of collateral held by banks. An example of an exposure variable is the net open 
position in foreign exchange. To measure indirect interest risk, the exposure variable to 
use would be interest coverage (Cihak, 2004a).. 
 
3.3.2 Foreign Exchange Rate Risk (FX rate risk)  
 
FX rate risk can arise from positions in foreign currency, as well as those in local 
currency, that are dependent on foreign exchange rates. Foreign exchange rate risk can be 
direct when banking institutions have positions in foreign currency, or indirect when the 
foreign exchange positions of the banking institutions‘ borrowers may affect their 
creditworthiness. 
The direct FX rate risk can be assessed through the net open position in foreign exchange. 
To illustrate this, let F denote the net open position in foreign exchange, C – the capital, 
ARW – the risk-weighted assets expressed in domestic currency units, and e – the 
exchange rate in units of foreign currency per unit of domestic currency. A decrease in the 
exchange rate leads to a proportional decline in the domestic currency value of the foreign 
exchange exposure, that is de/e=dF/F for F≠0. Let us assume that this translates directly 
into a decline in capital: dC/dF=1. The impact of the exchange rate shock on the ratio of 
capital to risk-weighted assets is then expressed as (Cihak, 2004a): 
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where symbol ―  ‖ means that the equation is approximate for changes other than very 
small. This equation can be rewritten as: 
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The term dARW /dC, which reflects the degree of co-movement of capital and risk-
weighted assets, may vary from 0 to 1. In the special case of dARW /dC=0 when the risk-
weighted assets do not change, the change in the capital adequacy ratio equals simply the 
exchange rate shock times the exposure, measured as a product of F/C, ratio of net open 
position in foreign exchange to capital, and C/ARW, the capital adequacy ratio. 
The indirect FX risk is often more significant than the direct one, because the direct 
exposure is relatively easy to measure and therefore to regulate. In contrast, it may be 
more difficult to monitor the foreign exchange vulnerabilities of banks‘ counterparties, 
especially in countries with fixed or thoroughly regulated exchange rates. Firms and 
population in such case can be deceived by the seeming absence of foreign exchange risk 
and can enter into large open positions in foreign exchange. To get an expression for the 
indirect risk, let us denote the corporate sector‘s debt as Dc(e), equity as Ec(e), and open 
foreign exchange position as Fc(e). Let us assume that, similarly to the case of the bank‘s 
net open position, a percentage change in the exchange rate will be mapped into the same 
percentage change in the domestic currency value of the corporate sector‘s net open 
position, which will lead to an equivalent change in the corporate sector‘s equity: 
dEc/de=dFc/de=F/e. The impact of the exchange rate on corporate leverage (Dc/Ec) is 
then expressed as (Cihak, 2004a): 
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Thus, if the corporate sector has insufficient amount of foreign exchange, a decline in the 
exchange rate would lead to an increase in its leverage. Corporate leverage is usually 
positively correlated with the share of banks‘ NPLs in total loans (denoted as NPL/TL): 
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The impact of a change in the exchange rate on the NPL/TL ratio can then be expressed as 
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In the special case when dDc/dEc=0, the change in the NPL/TL ratio would equal the 
exchange rate change times the net open position, times the parameter a, which can be 
estimated empirically. To find the impact on capital adequacy, it can be assumed that the 
credit shock has the form of a transition of performing loans into the nonperforming 
category. By differentiating C/ARW with respect to NPL/TL, and substituting for NPL/TL 
from the last equation, it follows that (Cihak, 2004a): 
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where provisions are assumed to be a fixed percentage (π) of NPLs, and are deducted 
directly from capital. 
 
3.3.3 Interest Rate Risk 
 
Interest rate risk is the exposure of a bank‘s financial condition to adverse movements in 
interest rates. Interest rate changes affect interest income and interest expenses, as well as 
the balance sheet, through changes in market prices of financial instruments. 
The impact of changes in the interest rate on net interest income is typically measured 
using the ―repricing gap‖ model. The model allocates interest-bearing assets and liabilities 
into baskets according to the time till repricing, and the gap between assets and liabilities 
in each basket is used to estimate the net interest income exposure to interest rate changes. 
The position in interest-bearing financial derivatives can be incorporated into analysis by 
recalculating the expected future receipts and payments as interest rates change. Two 
approaches are commonly used to measure the impact of interest rate changes on market 
prices of financial instruments: the duration model and the gap model. Duration, defined 
as the weighted average term to maturity of assets or liabilities, is a direct measure of the 
interest rate elasticity of an asset or liability. The higher is the duration, the more sensitive 
is the price of an asset or liability to changes in interest rates.  
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where A(rA) and L(rL) are the market values of assets and liabilities of the banking 
system; rA and rL are annual interest rates on assets and liabilities. From here, the impact 
of change in interest rate on the banks‘ capital may be determined. If the capital is defined 
as A(rA) – L(rL) and divided by risk-weighted assets, then, differentiating it with respect to 
interest rate on assets and substituting from (3.3.3.1), the sensitivity of the ratio (C/ARW) 
to the changes in interest rate changes will be defined as (Cihak, 2004a): 
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with  the assumption that the risk-weight assets change proportionately to total assets, that 
is, dARW/ARW = dA/A. In the expression above, GAPD is the duration gap, expressed as 
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  An alternative approach to assessing the price revaluation effect of an interest rate shock 
is gap analysis. Under this approach, expected payments on assets and liabilities are sorted 
into time baskets according to the time till repricing, for floating-rate instruments, and to 
the time till maturity, for fixed-rate instruments. The net present value of assets and 
liabilities can be calculated by discounting the net cashflows in each time basket, while 
the effect of an interest rate shock may be estimated by rediscounting the net cash flows 
using the changed interest rates.  
 
 
 
3.3.4 Liquidity Risk  
 
Liquidity risk is the risk that assets would not be available to match the maturing 
liabilities. Stress testing the liquidity of the banking sector involves assessing the impact 
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on the liquidity gap of a shock like big-scale deposit withdrawals, a large fall in the price 
of assets, or an exchange rate crisis. 
The most challenging step in designing a liquidity stress test is concerned with defining 
which assets that are normally considered liquid may become illiquid in crisis periods. 
IMF (2003a) provides the guidelines for defining such groups of liquid assets and liquid 
liabilities. In addition, off-balance sheet positions, for example, derivatives or 
commitments by credit lines, can have a significant impact on liquidity and should be also 
included into the stress tests. 
A straightforward approach to stress testing for liquidity risk is to shock the value of 
liquid resources by a certain percentage or amount. The size of shock could be determined 
on the basis of past bank failures or on a ―rule of thumb‖, and it should generally be 
different for different maturities. A ―rule of thumb‖ is that a bank should be able to 
survive at least five days of a moderate liquidity run without outside support (Cihak, 
2004a). The reason for choosing such term is that liquidity should be enough for the bank 
to survive a 5-day working week until the weekend, when banks are closed. This 
consideration period would enable the bank and the regulator to assess the situation better 
and take the precautionary actions.  
A version of liquidity risk is the risk of concentration of banks‘ liabilities. Such risk is 
typically modelled as if there occurred sudden withdrawals by the banks‘ largest 
depositors. Another version of liquidity risk is the event of bank-to-bank contagion of 
liquidity stress. An example of such contagion could be a run on a bank perceived as 
―weak,‖ which is triggered by liquidity problems in another bank. Such case is discussed 
in the following section.  
 
3.3.5 Interbank Contagion Stress Test 
 
Interbank stress testing aims at measuring the risk that the failure of a bank or a group of 
banks will trigger the failure of other banks within the system. 
There may be a number of interbank contagion channels. The most direct one is contagion 
through uncollateralized interbank lending. Other possible channels include reputational 
effects, when an observed problem with stability in one bank could complicate for other 
banks in the system the attraction of funds in international markets, either due to total 
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impossibility to borrow or because of significant increase in the funding costs. The 
reputational effect of a failure of a bank can also lead to liquidity runs on other banks that 
are perceived as weak. Methodologically, modeling reputational effects is similar to 
modeling contagion through lending exposures. Empirically, however, it is much more 
difficult to define the ―exposures‖ for reputational risk. For this purpose, other 
information sources, such as news, may be used. 
Further, the focus is put on the risk of contagion through banks‘ uncollateralized interbank 
loans. There are two basic types of interbank stress tests: (i) the pure interbank stress test, 
where the shock is the failure of one bank, and the impact on other banks in the system is 
made through the interbank exposures; (ii) the integrated interbank stress test, where the 
banking system is first subjected to macro shocks or scenarios, and if those trigger a 
failure of a bank or a group of banks, the interbank stress test is conducted to assess the 
impact of additional failures through interbank exposures. 
The key element of interbank contagion stress testing is a matrix of interbank exposures. 
The cells of the matrix contain the gross interbank exposures between banks, defined as 
all uncollateralized lending from one bank to another, including all on- and off-balance 
sheet exposures. Each row in the matrix corresponds to a bank and the cells in the row 
give its gross interbank exposure with respect to every other bank in the interbank market. 
The pure interbank contagion stress test aims to answer the question of whether the failure 
of any bank (or group of banks) would lead to failures of other banks in the system. It can 
also be used to show how much other banks are weakened as a result of one bank‘s 
failure, as well as to define which banks are a potential source of systemic risk.  
The pure contagion test assumes that there is a failure in a bank (for example, Bank A). 
The first round of the contagion calculation would than calculate the direct impact of 
Bank A‘s failure on each of the other banks, assuming Bank A would not repay its 
uncollateralized interbank exposures. If some banks fail as a result of Bank A‘s failure, 
the second round of the calculation would calculate the impact on each of the remaining 
banks of these newly failed banks not repaying their uncollateralized interbank exposures. 
The process can be repeated further if there are new failures after the second run. 
Two indicators of systemic risk can be calculated from the pure interbank stress test: 
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1) a frequency of bank failure indicator, which is the ratio of the cumulative number of 
failures to the number of banks in the system;  
2) statistical measures of the impact on bank system capital (for example, mean, 
distribution, and quartiles). Specifically, a systemic risk index may be defined as the 
average reduction in the capital ratios of banks in the system triggered by the failure of the 
systemically most important banks. Such a measure could be computed for all banks in 
the system and used to rank them by their systemic importance (Cihak, 2004a). 
The macro contagion test differs from the pure contagion test in that it focuses on 
interbank contagion triggered by a macroeconomic stress. Firstly, it exposes the banking 
system to a macroeconomic scenario of shocks. Secondly, if the scenario leads to failures 
of some banks, the pure contagion test is conducted. The main difference is that the 
contagion takes place in a system that has already been weakened by the macroeconomic 
scenario or shock, so it is more likely that it will result in further bank failures. If the 
scenario does not trigger any bank failures, one possible conclusion is that there is no 
interbank contagion for this particular scenario (however, there might still be liquidity 
problems, if that banks have imperfect information about their counterparties). 
Alternatively, it is possible to estimate the largest shock that does not trigger yet a chain 
reaction in the system. To do this, it is needed to escalate the macroeconomic shocks until 
the weakest institution (or group of weakest institutions) fails, and calculate the interbank 
contagion effects as in the pure contagion test.  
Similarly to the pure interbank contagion stress test, quantitative measures of systemic 
risk can be produced, for example, frequency of bank failures. However, the index of 
systemic risk in such case is different and needs to be decomposed into two components: 
(i) the average reduction in capital ratios due to the total shock; and (ii) the further 
reduction in the average of capital ratios implied by the failure of the bank due to the 
shock, which causes it to default on its loans. This latter index is identical to the one in the 
pure stress test. 
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Chapter 4. Project Timeline 
 
April-May 2009 – reviewing the literature, preparing the research proposal including 
research strategy, task setup, review of literature and general methodology description; 
June-August 2009 – detailing the proposal, specifying the approaches to methodology: 
defining and detailing ways and procedures of estimation, data needed, consequence of 
steps to perform, number of institutions to include into the analysis, and the criteria for 
choosing the institutions mentioned; 
September-December 2009 – collecting the data for banks (balance sheets, financial 
statements, possibly interbank lending amounts) and economy (time series of inflation, 
foreign exchange rates, interest rates, GDP dynamics); developing the model, based on the 
concepts available from the  research literature; transforming the data into the database 
suitable for research needs; 
January-May 2010 – estimating the model, developing the practical and theoretical 
implications; 
May-September 2010 – producing the draft of the thesis; 
October-December 2010 – introducing corrections and improvements according to the 
discussions with fellow students, specialists and advisors; producing second draft of the 
thesis;  
January-May 2011 – preparing the final version of the thesis. 
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